Vo Nguyen Giap

Nui Lua, a Vietnamese phrase translating roughly to "snow covered volcano" is used in describing the seemingly calm exterior and burning, passionate inside of one of the twentieth century’s most influential leaders, Vo Nguyen Giap. He has been described him as forceful, arrogant, impatient and dogmatic, but his influence in the Vietnamese struggle for independence is unrivaled by any, with the plausible exception of Ho Chi Mihn himself.

Giap was born in An Xa in the Quang Binh province to a reasonably wealthy, middle class family. He enrolled in a French school called Quoc Hoc in Hue around the age of 16, but was expelled for his continued involvement in a revolutionary youth movement called Tan Viet Cach Mang Dang. At the age of 21 he enrolled at a university in Hanoi and received a degree after three years. During his time at Hanoi University he converted to the Communist ideology.

In September 1939, the French officially banned all communist practices and Giap was forced to take refuge in China. It was at this time that he first met Ho Chi Mihn, at the Chingsi Conference in May 1941. Here, the Viet Mihn were officially organized for the purpose of liberating Vietnam from oppression.

Describing himself as self-taught, Giap never received any formal military training. He began leading a group of 34 guerillas, but by the end of his career he was commander of the world’s third largest army.

After commanding Viet Mihn forces against the Japanese during World War II, mostly with the help of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Giap turned the offensive against the French and then subsequently against the United States. He turned the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) into a potent and effective fighting force.

The success of the Viet Mihn as a fighting force is a direct result of Vo Nguyen Giap. He was a successful leader for primarily three reasons; His unwavering, charismatic belief in the ideal of Vietnamese nationalism, his ability to read and act appropriately to changes in political climate, and his practical knowledge of how to militarily conduct a people’s war, including the logistics of mass troop and supply transportation.

In an essay entitled General Vo Nguyen Giap as Military Man and Poet, Cicil B. Curry said, “I have met and talked with Giap…. He is not a nice man. Giap is best known for his fanatical obsession with freeing his homeland from western domination and uniting it under the communist rule of Ha Noi.” Despite this, Giap is said by his compatriots to have a charisma and passion that was welcomed and inspiring to those around him. A poem entitled Kiss which is attributed to him was found in a dead soldiers copy book. The poem shows the depth of his commitment.

The earth bore you here.
To bring beauty.
The earth bore me here
To love you deeply.

In love people kiss.
The sweetness they would not miss.
My heart is passionate for you
Still I must go to battle.

My love, it is possible
That I may die in combat
The lips torn there by bullets
Might never be kissed [again] by yours.

Even if I die, my love,
I love you, though I am unable
To kiss you with the lips
Of a slave.
(Translation: Ho Thi Xuan Hong, Nguyen Hai Quoc, Nguyen Khac Niem)

This poem shows his dedication to the conflict as well as the respect and inspiration that individual soldiers must have had in order to personally carry such literature. This also is, perhaps, a shadow of the feelings that Giap, himself, may have experienced with the loss of his wife, Quang Thai, who was tortured and killed under French captivity.

The personal relationships based on mutual understanding and suffering which Giap shared with his men helped to strengthen the cause of the resistance and provided a tangible sense of fraternity. Giap said, “Literature can and must elevate a man’s soul,” and throughout his career, Giap coupled his skills in literature along with his own patriotic sentiments to become a tangible embodiment of the Vietnamese cause.

Throughout the Vietnam conflict Giap wrote and published many works. Many of these addressed the issues of Vietnamese nationalism and assessments of the war. He understood the role that literature played in, not only increasing morale among his troops, but also in spreading ideology and promoting Vietnamese nationalism on an international stage.

Along with literature, Giap also expressed his feelings though his skills as an orator. During a tribute to Nguyen Trai, a fable Vietnamese hero’s, sixth hundred birthday, Giap said he was “very proud of his beautiful country with its imposing mountains and rivers, its abundance of produce, proud of its old civilization and unique lifestyle, proud of its brilliant and heroic history of resisting foreign aggression.” He said of the Viet Mihn’s struggle against the French that “talents were like leaves in the autumn, and heroes appeared like the dawn" (Vo Nguyen Giap as Military Man and Poet).

Continuing along this line, Giap said in a later publication that, “In its [the Viet Mihn’s] ranks are the finest sons of Vietnam, the most sincere patriots from all revolutionary classes, from all nationalities—majority as well as minority people” (The Military Art or People’s War, p. 109). Giap truly respected the sacrifice of his men and was respected in turn.

Giap’s correspondence with his men always possessed “emotional statement of longing for an absent loved one, yearning for reunion, while simultaneously declaiming the necessity of fulfilling his warrior's responsibilities of battle and possible death” (Vo Nguyen Giap as Military Man and Poet). For this reason, Giap had the trust of his men. They believed in his ability to lead them to victory and looked to him as not only as a figure-head in some obscure war, but as the backbone of a people’s war.

Giap, in a 26 part television special entitled People’s Century gave his definition of a “people’s war”. He said

It was a war for the people by the people. For the people because the war's goals are the people's goals— goals such as independence, a unified country, and the happiness of its people.... And by the people— well that means ordinary people— not just the army but all people.

Giap’s charismatic ability to relate to his people and lead them through the conflict was essential to the Vietnamese nationalist cause. He knew that the potential success to Vietnamese nationalism lay in motivating the people to war.

The Vietnamese people have a heritage of fighting off foreign aggression. Over their history they have “repelled thousands of invaders” from the Chinese in the 13th century to a variety of tribal revolts. Thomas Hodgkins, an English historian, noted in the journal Race and Class that “Vietnamese peasants long ago acquired— and have passed on from generation to generation— a grasp of revolutionary methods, a knowledge of what to do in a revolutionary situation” (People’s Century Interview). Giap had a perfect understanding of Vietnamese heritage in the regard. He knew how to tap Vietnam’s most valuable resource, its people.
However, the difference between these early struggles and nationalist struggles beginning in the 19th century is that, where as before they were fighting invaders on the same economic basis as themselves, with the introduction of the French colonial system they were fighting against a western imperial power. It was for this reason, more then any other, that it was necessary for a uniting of the people under charismatic leadership with military and political genius.

Lieut. Gen Hoang Van Thai, one of the Senior Military Chiefs during the struggle said in his book, Some Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare in Vietnam, that their movement was organized on “correct political and military lines… [with] creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete situation in Viet Nam” (p. 243). Thai continues to address strategies of guerrilla warfare saying it is a “form of struggle of the large masses of the people, of the local military and paramilitary forces which are weak or relatively weak, against much better equipped enemy troops” (p.242). Both Thai and Giap understood the role that guerrilla warfare would play in the Vietnamese struggle for independence. They knew that guerrilla warfare was the primary characteristics of a people’s war. Giap said, “We had to resort to different measures, some of which are quite simple, like hiding in man-holes and evacuating to the countryside. And we fought back with all our forces and with every kind of weapon” (CNN Cold War Interview).
The revolution’s leadership aimed “…at maintaining and strengthening combativeness, uniting true patriotism with proletarian internationalism, developing revolutionary heroism and the great tradition of our army summed up in its slogan: “Resolved to fight, determined to win” (Vo Nguyen Giap, The Military Art of Peoples War, p.111).

The nationalist movement was determined to win at all costs. They used any means necessary to bring about their goals. Giap was willing to exploit any new diplomatic development or capitalize on any weakness that he viewed in the enemy. Giap said in a CNN interview about the U.S. leadership during the revolution that “They didn't understand our will to maintain independence and equality between nations even though these are stated in President Jefferson's manifestation. And so they made mistakes.”

Giap continued to say that the U.S. did not understand the concept of defeat. That they thought that they could win the war through pure dominant force and that they never understood the true nature of the conflict. He said, concerning the Americans, “They could not win. How could they win? As our president said, there was nothing more precious than independence and freedom. We had the spirit that we would govern our own nation; we would rather sacrifice than be slaves” (CNN Cold War Interview).

When all is said and done, it could be said that the war in Vietnam was a fight that could not be won by body count of by the occupation of territory. In this type of conflict, true victory came only from controlling the hearts and the minds of the people. Giap said, “The Vienamese people’s war of liberation proved that in insufficiently equipped people’s army, but an army fighting for a just cause, can, with appropriate strategy and tactics, combine the conditions needed to conquer a modern army of aggressive imperialism” (Vo Nguyen Giap, Military Art of Peoples War, p. 95). Giap had an appropriate appreciation for his people’s struggle for independence that made him able to guide them to independence through his charismatic leadership.

Along with being able to motivating his people to war, Giap was able to adequately understand the international political climate upon which the war was staged. This is perfectly portrayed in his broadcast, The Big Victory; The Great Task, on 17 – 20 September, 1967 where he talks about the political crisis that the U.S. was in during the 1966-1967 campaign season

Since they have been tied firmly to the war of aggression in Viet Nam and have suffered one failure after another, the U.S. imperialists have increasingly revealed their weaknesses and flaws. Revolutionary people the world over have more clearly realized that the U.S. imperialists are wealthy but not strong and that their economic and military potential, although great, are nonetheless limited. The U.S. imperialists are being defeated by a small but heroic people. The more they prolong the war of aggression in Viet Nam, the more the U.S. imperialists are isolated politically in the world.

In this work, he continues to discuss American involvement in both international and domestic theatres. He discusses the troubles ensuing in the U.S., in the Middle East and the Near East, the military victories of Israel, and the Latin American struggles against American intervention. On U.S. domestic issues, Giap discusses “the U.S. Negroes’ boiling and widespread struggle” and the problems of increasing protest that the Johnson administration has continually endured. He said, “In the U.S. itself, the Johnson government is confronted with the contradictions among the U.S. ruling clique and the U.S. people’s increasingly strong protest” (The Big Victory; The Great Task, p. 222).

Giap logically analyses the U.S. position and their future objectives; that they will increase their involvement in the war, increasing bombing raids, and stepping up strikes on logistical targets in hopes to break the stalemate and rapidly end the war.

After an appropriate and lengthy assessment of the U.S. political situation Giap then emphasizes steps that they must take to counter those aims and to solidly defeat their enemy. In this particular situation, the call was to further the stalemate, to repeatedly harass the enemy and destroy as many large units as possible. On the political front, their goal was to continue “striving to strengthen and develop the liberated areas and to mobilize more manpower and wealth to further step up and lead the resistance to final victory” (p.227).

Although this is only an analysis of 1966-1967, it is a prime example of the kind of analytical thinking that Giap did throughout the nationalist conflict, both with the French and with the Americans. He was able to read the situation on multiple levels, from the international level to that of a single guerrilla fighter under his command. With his political mind he was able to exploit weaknesses in foreign policy through a variety of channels.

In addition, Giap was consistently involved in the process of reading and countering the movements of his enemy. He was a master at interpreting enemy forces and reading the intentions of enemy commanders. No where is this more brilliantly displayed than in Giap’s most recognized victory, the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1953.

General Navarre, the French commander at the time, realized that time was running out for the French forces to make a resounding victory. He wished to draw the Viet Mihn forces into a large scale battle, convinced that the French would win the conflict. As the spot, Navarre set up a defensive position in a valley which would block Viet Mihn forces returning from campaigns to their safe-houses in neighboring Laos.

Giap was able to see this situation played out in his mind and adapt creatively to the situation. He had his troops disassemble artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry and ammunition and transport it to the ridges surrounding the valley. It is said that thousands of men were used to transport the hundreds of tons of equipment and munitions needed for a prolonged siege using only reinforced bicycles.

Giap concentrated about 8,000 men on these hilltops along with 200 pieces of heavy artillery totaling his forces to around 15,000 men. On May 7, 1954, the French were forced to surrender, unable to support or supply their position, being completely out-gunned from an elevated position. Giap said about the conflict

The enemy wanted to concentrate their forces. We compelled them to disperse. By successively launching strong offensives on the points they had left relatively unprotected, we obliged them to scatter their troops all over the place in order to ward off our blows, and thus created favorable conditions for the attack at Dien Bien Phu (Military Art of People War, p. 91).

Despite his lack of formal military training, Giap was a military genius. As demonstrated with the battle of Dien Bien Phu, he was consistently involved in the process of outthinking his opponent and using every means at his disposal to insure victory. He was flexible in any way that would bring about a victorious end. He was a mastermind at maneuvering and conducting his “people’s war.”

One of Giap’s primary concerns was concentrating all of his assets and constructing them into an effective fighting force towards independence. This was a multifaceted effort involved the aforementioned guerrilla war tactics along with more conventional methods of combat. At each stage of the conflict Giap used all measures at his disposal to ensure a victory for his cause. He said

The enemy mopped up; we fought against mopping-up. They organized supplementary local Vietnamese troops and installed puppet authorities; we firmly upheld people’s power, overthrew straw men, eliminated traitors, and carried out active propaganda to bring about the disintegration of the supplementary forces (Military Art of Peoples War, p. 87-88).

Perhaps the greatest measure to Giap’s military prowess was his ability to transport material and personnel. As mentioned earlier, the success of his forces at Dien Bien Phu was due primarily to his ability to transport artillery and equipment to an elevated position using primarily primitive means. Transportation would be a major aspect of the Vietnam conflict from this point and on throughout the American involvement. No where is this more evident then in the construction, use, and maintenance of the Ho Chi Mihn Trail.

The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a very extensive system; it started with a trail but later became a road, or a series of roads. “And also there were the extensive systems of gas pipelines and communications lines, and routes on rivers and across the sea” (CNN Interview). The trail was one of the key targets throughout many of the U.S. bombing campaigns and was the backbone for the resistance. Giap, understood the significance of the trail. He said “We did everything possible to keep the whole system going. I visited many important points which were subjected to many B-52 bombings 23 out of 24 hours a day; we had many teams working toward maintaining the operation” (CNN Cold War Interview).

Through use of the Ho Chi Mihn trail, the Viet Mihn was able to supply and remain in communication with resistance forces in the south. Military planning and nation-wide strikes were assessable primarily because of this trail. The Tet Offensive is a perfect example of such a coordinated, nationwide strike that would only be available with advanced communication and transportation that the trial provided.

Many say that the Tet Offensive was the instance that changed U.S. public opinion and won the war for the Viet Mihn. The offensive showed ability of the Ho Chi Mihn Trail to transport materials and personnel, as well as the orders and information needed to perform such a large coordinated offensive. Along with this, the Tet offensive also emphasizes Giap and the resistances’ skill at fighting the war and their resolve to win.

Walter Cronkite is seen by many to have been the embodiment of U.S. public opinion about Vietnam. In a CBS broadcast to America following the offensive he said

To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in a stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion…. It is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out, then, will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could (A Reporter’s Life, p. 258).

Bill Moyers, the President’s news secretary, recalled that when President Lyndon Johnson heard the report he said, “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost middle America” (p. 259).

The use of the Ho Chi Mihn Trail was essential to bringing about the Tet Offensive which would become the turning point of the war. In addition, Giap once again demonstrated his ability to read the situation and to act upon it. He said about the conflict, “The truth is that we saw things in their entirety and knew that in the end, we had to de-escalate the war. At that point, the goal of the offensive was to try to de-escalate the war” (People’s Century Interview). At another point Giap said

It could be said [Tet] was a surprise attack which brought us a big victory. For a big battle we always figured out the objectives, the targets, so it was the main objective to destroy the forces and to obstruct the Americans from making war. But what was more important was to de-escalate the war -- because at that time the American were escalating the war -- and to start negotiations. So that was the key goal of that campaign. (CNN Cold War Interview)

Many historians have tried to debunk Giap and the resistances’ success in the Tet Offensive during which the sustained heavy losses. However, from Giap’s perspective and with a view of their goals behind the offensive, it can be seen only as a success looking backward with a historical perspective. Giap ultimately said that the greatest impact of the Tet Offensive was bringing the Americans back to the negotiation table because he, in turn, had brought the war “to the living rooms of Americans back home” (CNN Interview).

Giap, throughout the Vietnamese struggle for independence, continually showed that he was the man for the job. Although containing what some would can an abrasive personality, he was able, on numerous occasions, to lead his forces to victory on the battlefield.

Giap exemplified the intense nationalist zeal that was characteristic of the Vietnam conflict. Because of this, he was a perfect leader for the resistance. He was able to empathize with his men and motivate them through his skills as both a writer and orator. His charismatic leadership made him endearing to his followers and his perpetual energy drove men to follow and obey his orders.

Along with this, Giap was able to read political climates and exploit them to the benefit of the resistance. As was the case with the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and also his assessment of the American involvement in 1966-1967, he was politically adept at reading and countering military maneuvers and seeing the results of each action.

He was far-sighted in all of his planning, including the building and maintenance of the Ho Chi Mihn Trail. As with the Tet Offensive, Giap’s usage of the trail and all means necessary to plan and execute a nationwide resistance prove his versatility and adeptness as a leader.
Giap, was a key figure in the resistance, he was the target of many American strike teams sent to remove him from command. With his skill, his experience, and his resolve to fight, General Vo Nguyen Giap was one the most important figures throughout all of the Vietnamese nationalist movement, working together with Ho Chi Mihn to facilitate and achieve his goals of a free and unified Vietnam.


Cicil B. Curry. General Vo Nguyen Giap as Military Man and Poet. http://lists.village.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Currey _Giap.html

Cicil B. Curry. Victory at Any Cos. Cicil B. Curry: 1996.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/style/longterm/books/chap1/victoryatanycost.htm

CNN.com. CNN Cold War Interview with Vo Nguyen Giap. May 1996.
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/11/interviews/giap/

General Vo Nguyen Giap. “The Big Victory, the Great Task,” in Nham Dan and Quan Doi Nham Dan. Hanoi: broadcast on 17-20 September 1967

General Vo Nguyen Giap. The Military Art of People’s War. Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970

Generals Vo Nguyen Giap and Van Tien Dung. How We Won the War. Philadelphia: ReCON Publications, 1976

Hoang Van Thai. Some Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare in Vietnam. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965

PBS/WBGH. People’s Century Interview with Vo Nguyen Giap, 1998. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/peoplescentury/episodes/
guerrillawars/giaptranscript.html

Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Vo Neguyen Giap. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vo_Nguyen_Giap